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| It is impossible to rightly govern a nation without God and the Bible. ~George Washington |
Washington's Farewell Address 1796
Page 4: On Political Parties
I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the State, with particular reference to
the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more
comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of
the spirit of party generally.
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest
passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less
stifled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest
rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.
The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge,
natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most
horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and
permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of
men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later
the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns
this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.
Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be
entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to
make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. It serves always to
distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community
with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another,
foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and
corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of
party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will
of another.
There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of
the government and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is
probably true; and in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with indulgence,
if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in governments
purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain
there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant
danger of excess, the effort ought to be by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it.
A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame,
lest, instead of warming, it should consume.
It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in
those entrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective
constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach
upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the
departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism.
A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the
human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal
checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different
depositaries, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions by the
others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country
and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in
the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in
any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution
designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may
be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are
destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or
transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield.
Page 4: On Political Parties
I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the State, with particular reference to
the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more
comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of
the spirit of party generally.
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest
passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less
stifled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest
rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.
The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge,
natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most
horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and
permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of
men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later
the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns
this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.
Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be
entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to
make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. It serves always to
distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community
with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another,
foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and
corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of
party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will
of another.
There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of
the government and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is
probably true; and in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with indulgence,
if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in governments
purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain
there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant
danger of excess, the effort ought to be by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it.
A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame,
lest, instead of warming, it should consume.
It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in
those entrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective
constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach
upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the
departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism.
A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the
human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal
checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different
depositaries, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions by the
others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country
and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in
the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in
any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution
designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may
be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are
destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or
transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield.
Page 5: On Religion and Government
Page 3: On Constitution
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