The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, January 16, 1788


To the People of the State of New York:

THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government
reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking.

The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is
evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles
of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political
experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart
from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as
no longer defensible.

What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by
recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to the constitution of different States, no
satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has
passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute
power over the great body of the people is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles.
Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same
appellation. The government of England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and
monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as
dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political

If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define
a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or
during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from
an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions
by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of
republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or
indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every
government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well
executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to the constitution of every State in the Union, some
or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most of them, the chief
magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate
branches of the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite
period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years. According to the
provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the
subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior.

On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the
most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures,
is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland,
derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people,
according to the example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several
States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally
conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically
elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the
period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the
Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and
Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election
is annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate.
And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any
time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought
to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably
to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.

Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its
absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the
republican form to each of the latter.

"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican
form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY
of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a
CONSOLIDATION of the States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The
handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision.

Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just
estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the
convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could
supply any defect of regular authority.

First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which
it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to
the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of
the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is
to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent
States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the
supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will
not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.

That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as
forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is
to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States.
It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their
ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the
people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States
would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority
must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as
evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in
ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own
voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL

The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of
Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion,
and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not
FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these
will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government
is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election
of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio,
which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual
election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this
particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic.
From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as
NATIONAL features.

The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is
supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their
political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the
Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely
as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they
must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the
government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan;
and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential
proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.

But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we
contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an
authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of
lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national
legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal
legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or
abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the
supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to
them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty
over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal
which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the
case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual
precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and
a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments,
or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly
NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the
MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every
national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of
each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of
the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring
more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the
NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of
States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of
both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are
drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of
them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly
federal nor wholly national.

Text supplied by
Project Gutenberg
The Constitution Society
& The Avalon Project
Philosophy of
Socialism in America

"The struggle of History is not
between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat; it is between government
and the governed."

Jerry McDaniel
The Illinois Conservative