Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention
By James Madison
June 30, 1787
Saturday June 30, 1787

IN CONVENTION

Mr. BREARLY moved that the President write to the Executive of New Hampshire, informing it that the business depending
before the Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the deputies of that State. In support of
his motion he observed that the difficulties of the subject and the diversity of opinions called for all the assistance we could
possibly obtain. [it was well understood that the object was to add New Hampshire to the north of States opposed to the
doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed from her relative size she must be adverse to].

Mr. PATTERSON seconded the motion

Mr. RUTLIDGE could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a measure. They are not unapprised of the meeting,
and can attend if they choose. Rhode Island might as well be urged to appoint and send deputies. Are we to suspend the
business until the deputies arrive? if we proceed he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could
produce its effect.

Mr. KING said he had written more than once as a private correspondent, and the answers gave him every reason to expect
that State would be represented very shortly, if it should be so at all. Circumstances of a personal nature had hitherto
prevented it. A letter could have no effect.

Mr. WILSON wished to know whether it would be consistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to communicate to New
Hampshire that the business was of such a nature as the motion described. It would spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted
the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject; the meeting being merely voluntary-on the motion of Mr Brearly:

Massachusetts, no. Connecticut, no. New York, aye. New Jersey, aye. Pennsylvania, not on the floor. Delaware, not on
floor. Maryland, divided. Virginia, no. North Carolina, no. South Carolina, no. Georgia, not on floor.

The motion of Mr. Elseworth resumed for allowing each State an equal vote in the 2d. branch.

Mr. WILSON did not expect such a motion after the establishment of the contrary principle in the 1st branch; and
considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the 1st branch. The Gentleman
from Connecticut [Mr. Elseworth] had pronounced that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States North of
Pennsylvania one only would agree to any General Government. He entertained more favorable hopes of Connecticut and of
the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a Country to which
they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties.

But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of
America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place, it could never
happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday against the just principle of representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people
of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there was any room for change, it could not
be on the side of the majority, the question will be shall less than 1/4 of the United States withdraw themselves from the
Union; or shall more than 3/4 renounce the inherent, indisputable, and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial
systems of States.

If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would choose to join it. The gentlemen from Connecticut in supposing that the
preponderancy secured to the majority in the 1st branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in the 2nd branch
for the security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to control in all cases
whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will control six: Seven States, according to the
estimates that had been used, composed 24/90 of the whole people. It would be in the power then of less than 1/3 to overrule
2/3 whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner.

Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called States? Will our
honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with being told that the
one third compose the greater number of States? The rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2nd as in
the 1st branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be
local, confined and temporary. This will expand with the expansion, and grow with the growth of the United States.

Much has been said of an imaginary combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes of
aristocracy, has been charged on it. No explanation however of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove
both from reason and history that rivalries would be more probable than coalitions; and that there are no coinciding interests
that could produce the latter. No answer has yet been given to the observations of [Mr. Madison] on this subject. Should the
Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the
other States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the three large States more aristocratic than those of
the small ones? Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is all a mere illusion of names.

We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed of. Is a real and fair majority, the natural hot-bed of aristocracy? It is
a part of the definition of this species of Government or rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. It is
true that a majority of States in the 2nd branch can not carry a law against a majority of the people in the 1st But this removes
half only of the objection. Bad Governments are of two sorts. 1. That which does too little. 2. That which does too much:
that which fails through weakness; and that which destroys through oppression. Under which of these evils do the United
States at present groan? Under the weakness and inefficiency of its Government. To remedy this weakness we have been sent
to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave the United States fettered precisely as heretofore; with
the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of the fair representation of the people in the 1st branch, defeated in
2nd. Twenty four will still control sixty six. He lamented that such a disagreement should prevail on the point of
representation, as he did not foresee that it would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the
General and the local authorities. He thought the States necessary and valuable parts of a good system.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. The capital objection of Mr. Wilson "that the minority will rule the majority" is not true. The power is
given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both
branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? Is it not the
case in the British Constitution the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of
Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation a negative on the laws, as a necessary defense of their peculiar rights
against the encroachments of the Commons.

No instance of a Confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are
running from one extreme to another. We are razing the foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No
salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States, to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for,
the 1st branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary. Although no particular abuses could
be foreseen by him, the possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive cases in which they
might result from such combinations.

Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports and no more were to be
established; Would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston-Philadelphia and some port in Chesapeake? A like concert
might be formed in the appointment of the great officers. He appealed again to the obligations of the federal pact which was
still in force, and which had been entered into with so much solemnity; persuading himself that some regard would still be
paid to the plighted faith under which each State small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general Councils.
His remarks were not the result of partial or local views. The State he represented [Connecticut] held a middle rank.

Mr. MADISON did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr. Elseworth, but must observe that it did not always accord
with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the Aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small.
Now the small are the House of Lords requiring a negative to defend them against the more numerous commons. Mr.
Elseworth had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated States had not retained to themselves a
perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system in which the King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr.
Elseworth of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and
which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government. Had the fact been as stated by Mr.
Elseworth, it would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments against him. The History
and fate of the several confederacies modern as well as Ancient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure.

In reply to the appeal of Mr. Elseworth to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked that the party
claiming from others an adherence to a common engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States
however, Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts
from which no State was free, the Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent vote, positively, refused to pass a law for
complying with the Requisitions of Congress and had transmitted a copy of the vote to Congress. It was urged, he said,
continually that an equality of votes in the 2nd branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe
to the large ones whose majority in the 1st branch was an effectual bulwark.

But notwithstanding this apparent defense, the majority of States might still injure the majority of people. 1. They could
obstruct the wishes and interests of the majority. 2. They could extort measures repugnant to the wishes and interest of the
Majority. 3. They could impose measures adverse thereto; as the 2nd branch will probably exercise some great powers, in
which the 1st will not participate. He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any class of citizens, or any description
of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought be given a constitutional
power of defense. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by
other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having
or not having slaves.

These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United States. It did not lie between the large and
small States: It lay between the Northern and Southern, and if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually
given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth that he had been casting about in his
mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was that instead of proportioning the
votes of the States in both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants, computing the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3,
they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only; and in the other according to the
whole number, counting the slaves as if free.

By this arrangement the Southern Scale would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He had been
restrained from proposing this expedient by two considerations: One was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests
on an occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself. The other was, the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two
branches, and which would destroy the equilibrium of interests.

Mr. ELSEWORTH assured the House that whatever might be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut, the State was
entirely federal in her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in supplying both men and money. The
muster rolls would show she had more troops in the field than Virginia. If she had been Delinquent, it had been from inability,
and not more so than other States.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Madison has animadverted on the delinquency of the States, when his object required him to prove that
the Constitution of Congress was faulty. Congress is not to blame for the faults of the States. Their measures have been right,
and the only thing wanting has been, a further power in Congress to render them effectual.

Mr. DAVY was much embarrassed and wished for explanations. The Report of the Committee allowing the Legislatures to
choose the Senate, and establishing a proportional representation in it, seemed to be impracticable. There will according to this
rule be ninety members in the outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was impossible that so
numerous a body could possess the activity and other qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the
report as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to prefer the latter.

The appointment of the Senate by electors chosen by the people for that purpose was, he conceived, liable to an insuperable
difficulty. The larger Counties or districts thrown into a general district, would certainly prevail over the smaller Counties or
districts, and merit in the latter would be excluded altogether. The report therefore seemed to be right in referring the
appointment to the Legislatures, whose agency in the general System did not appear to him objectionable as it did to some
others.

The fact was that the local prejudices and interests which could not be denied to exist, would find their way into the national
councils whether the Representatives should be chosen by the Legislatures or by the people themselves. On the other hand, if
a proportional representation was attended with insuperable difficulties, the making the Senate the Representative of the
States, looked like bringing us back to Congress again, and shutting out all the advantages expected from it. Under this view
of the subject he could not vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He though that in general there were extremes on
both sides. We were partly federal, partly national in our Union, and he did not see why the Government might not in some
respects operate on the States, in others on the people.

Mr. WILSON admitted the question concerning the number of Senators, to be embarrassing. If the smallest States be
allowed one, and the others in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to the time when the
smallest States will contain 100,000 souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in each for every 100,000 souls and let the
States not having that number of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to
the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise.

Dr. FRANKLIN. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional representation takes place, the small States
contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States say their money
will be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and
makes a good joint. In like manner here both sides must part with some of their demands, in order that they may join in some
accommodating proposition. He had prepared one which he would read, that it might lie on the table for consideration.

The proposition was in the words following"

"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose and send an equal number of Delegates, namely _____ who are to
compose the 2nd branch of the General Legislature.

"That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty of individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over
their own Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government within the several States augmented, each
State shall have equal suffrage.

"That in the appointment of all Civil officers of the. General Government in the election of whom the 2nd branch may by the
Constitution have part, each State shall have equal suffrage.

"That in fixing the Salaries of such officers, and in all allowances for public services, and generally in all appropriations and
dispositions of money to be drawn out of the General Treasury; and in all laws for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of
the several States shall have suffrage in proportion to the Sums which their respective States do actually contribute to the
Treasury. "Where a Ship had many owners this was the rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been one of the Ministers
from this Country to France during the joint war and would have been very glad if allowed a vote in distributing the money to
carry it on.

Mr. KING observed that the simple question was whether each State should have an equal vote in the 2nd branch; that it
must be apparent to those gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this equality, nor the report as it stood, that the report
was as susceptible of melioration as the motion; that a reform would be nugatory and nominal only if we should make another
Congress of the proposed Senate: that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed and unalterable, there could not be
less obstinacy on the other side, and that we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it:
that he was however filled with astonishment that if we were convinced that every man in America was secured in all his
rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of State sovereignty: that his feelings were more
harrowed and his fears more agitated for his Country than he could express, that he conceived this to be the last opportunity
of providing for its liberty and happiness.

He could not therefore but repeat his amazement that when a just Government founded on a fair representation of the people
of America was within our reach, we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom and importance
of States: that should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than to sit
down under a Government. founded in a vicious principle of representation, and which must be as short lived as it would be
unjust. He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted by Mr. Wilson: but he never could
listen to an equality of votes as proposed in the motion.

Mr. DAYTON. When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted for argument, he presumed they would have no
effect however eloquently spoken. It should have been shown that the evils we have experienced have proceeded from the
equality now objected to: and that the seeds of dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the General
Government. He considered the system on the table as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never
would be received by the people.

Mr. MARTIN, would never confederate if it could not be done on just principles.

Mr. MADISON would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due independence should be
given to the Senate. The plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the States. The Senate therefore is
only another edition of Congress. He knew the faults of that Body and had used a bold language against it. Still he would
preserve the State rights, as carefully as the trials by jury.

Mr. BEDFORD, contended that there was no middle way between a perfect consolidation and a mere confederacy of the
States. The first is out of the question, and in the latter they must continue if not perfectly, yet equally sovereign. If political
Societies possess ambition avarice, and all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought we not to
view them in this light here? Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him
look at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize
themselves at the expense of the small?

They think no doubt, that they have right on their side, but interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small
State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. South Carolina is actuated both by present interest
and future prospects. She hopes too to see the other States cut down to her own dimensions. North Carolina has the same
motives of present and future interest. Virginia follows. Maryland is not on that side of the Question. Pennsylvania has a direct
and future interest. Massachusetts has a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes.

Can it be expected that the small States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look at Great Britain. Is the Representation there
less unequal? But we shall be told again that that is the rotten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs however held
fast their constitutional rights? and are we to act with greater purity than the rest of mankind? An exact proportion in the
Representation is not preserved in any one of the States. Will it be said that an inequality of power will not result from an
inequality of votes? Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole History of mankind proves it.

The three large States have a common interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether a combination as we
suppose, or a competition as others suppose, shall take place among them, in either case, the smaller States must be ruined.
We must like Solon make such a Government as the people will approve. Will the smaller States ever agree to the proposed
degradation of them? It is not true that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Congress? The Language
of the people has been that Congress ought to have the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States when it may
be necessary.

On the first point they have been explicit and in a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this
and similar measures if they ever mean to discharge their engagements? The little States are willing to observe their
engagements, but will meet the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. We have been told with a dictatorial air
that this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good Government. It will be the last indeed if the propositions reported
from the Committee go forth to the people.

He was under no apprehensions. The Large States dare not dissolve the Confederation. If they do the small ones will find
some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them justice. He did not mean by this
to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence; which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal powers not
annihilating the federal system. This is what the people expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient Government and
why not make such an one; as they desire.

Mr. ELSEWORTH,. Under a National Government he should participate in the National Security, as remarked by [Mr. King]
but that was all. What he wanted was domestic happiness. The National Government could not descend to the local objects
on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation
of his rights to the State Governments. From these alone he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life. His
happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new born infant on its mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not
satisfactory, he had nothing to add that could be so.

Mr. KING was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the purposes
stated by Mr. Elseworth. He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a dangerous encroachment
on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised as he conceived that would give them all the security the nature of things
would admit of. In the establishment of Societies the Constitution was to the Legislature what the laws were to individuals. As
the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by express provisions in the State Constitutions; why may not a like security
be provided for the Rights of States in the National Constitution?

The articles of Union between England and Scotland furnish an example of such a provision in favor of sundry rights of
Scotland. When that Union was in agitation, the same language of apprehension which has been heard from the smaller States,
was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles however have not been violated and the Scotch have found an increase
of prosperity and happiness. He was aware that this will be called a mere paper security. He thought it a sufficient answer to
say that if fundamental articles of compact, are no sufficient defense against physical power, neither will there be any safety
against it if there be no compact.

He could not sit down, without taking some notice of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Bedford].
It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had marked the honorable gentleman himself. It was
not he who with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common
Country, and court the protection of some foreign hand. This too was the language of the Honorable member himself. He was
grieved that such a thought had entered into his heart. He was more grieved that such an expression had dropped from his
lips. The gentleman could only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself whatever might be his distress, he
would never court relief from a foreign power.

Adjourned
The Illinois Conservative