Saturday July 14, 1787

IN CONVENTION

Mr. L. MARTIN called for the question on the whole report, including the parts relating to the origination of money bills, and
the equality of votes in the 2nd branch.

Mr. GERRY  wished before the question should be put, that the attention of the House might be turned to the dangers
apprehended from Western States. He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not for putting ourselves into their hands.
They will if they acquire power like all men, abuse it. They will oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the Western
Country. To guard against these consequences, he thought it necessary to limit the number of new States to be admitted into
the Union, in such a manner, that they should never be able to outnumber the Atlantic States. He accordingly moved "that in
order to secure the liberties of the States already confederated, the number of Representatives in the 1st. branch, of the States
which shall hereafter be established, shall never exceed in number, the Representatives from such of the States as shall
accede to this confederation.

Mr. KING  seconded the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN, thought there was no probability that the number of future States would exceed that of the Existing States.
If the event should ever happen, it was too remote to be taken into consideration at this time. Besides, we are providing for
our posterity, for our children and our grand Children, who would be as likely to be citizens of new Western States, as of the
old States. On this consideration alone, we ought to make no such discrimination as was proposed by the motion.

Mr. GERRY  If some of our children should remove, others will stay behind, and he thought it incumbent on us to provide
for their interests. There was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States to the Western Country, and he did not wish
those remaining behind to be at the mercy of the Emigrants. Besides foreigners are resorting to that country, and it is
uncertain what turn things may take there.

On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr. Gerry, it passed in the negative.

Massachusetts, aye. Connecticut, aye. New Jersey, no. Pennsylvania, divided. Delaware, aye. Maryland, aye. Virginia, no.
North Carolina, no. South Carolina, no. Georgia, no.

Mr. RUTLIDGE proposed to reconsider the two propositions touching the originating of money bills in the first and the
equality of votes in the second branch.

Mr. SHERMAN was for the question on the whole at once. It was he said a conciliatory plan, it had been considered in all its
parts, a great deal of time had been spent on it, and if any part should now be altered, it would be necessary to go over the
whole ground again.

Mr. L. MARTIN urged the question on the whole. He did not like many parts of it. He did not like having two branches, nor
the inequality of votes in the 1st. branch. He was willing however to make trial of the plan, rather than do nothing.

Mr. WILSON traced the progress of the report through its several stages, remarking yet when on the question concerning an
equality of votes, the House was divided, our Constituents, had they voted as their representatives did, would have stood as
2/3 against the equality, and 1/3 only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known, and it will appear that this
fundamental point has been carried by 1/3 against 2/3 . What hopes will our Constituents entertain when they find that the
essential principles of justice have been violated in the outset of the Government. As to the privilege of originating money bills,
it was not considered by any as of much moment, and by many as improper in itself. He hoped both clauses would be
reconsidered. The equality of votes was a point of such critical importance, that every opportunity ought to be allowed, for
discussing and collecting the mind of the Convention on it.

Mr. L. MARTIN denies that there were 2/3 against the equality of votes. The States that please to call themselves large, are
the weakest in the Union. Look at Massachusetts; Look at Virginia. Are they efficient States? He was for letting a separation
take place if they desired it. He had rather there should be two Confederacies, than one founded on any other principle than an
equality of votes in the 2d. branch at least.

Mr. WILSON was not surprised that those who say that a minority is more than the majority should say that the minority is
stronger than the majority. He supposed the next assertion will be that they are richer also; though he hardly expected it
would be persisted in when the States shall be called on for taxes and troops.

Mr. GERRY also animadverted on Mr. L. Martins remarks on the weakness of Massachusetts. He favored the
reconsideration with a view not of destroying the equality of votes; but of providing that the States should vote per capita,
which he said would prevent the delays and inconveniences that had been experienced in Congress and would give a national
aspect and spirit to the management of business. He did not approve of a reconsideration of the clause relating to money bills.
It was of great consequence. It was the corner stone of the accommodation. If any member of the Convention had the
exclusive privilege of making propositions, would any one say that it would give him no advantage over other members. The
Report was not altogether to his mind. But he would agree to it as it stood rather than throw it out altogether.

The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to.

Mr. PINKNEY moved that instead of an equality of votes, the States should be represented in the 2d. branch as follows: New
Hampshire by 2 members. Massachusetts, 4. Rhode Island, 1. Connecticut, 3. New York, 3. New Jersey, 2. Pennsylvania, 4.
Delaware, 1. Maryland, 3. Virginia, 5. North Carolina, 3. South Carolina, 3. Georgia, 2; making in the whole, 36.

Mr. WILSON seconds the motion

Mr. DAYTON. The smaller States can never give up their equality. For himself he would in no event yield that security for
their rights
.
Mr. SHERMAN urged the equality of votes not so much as a security for the small States, as for the State Governments,
which could not be preserved unless they were represented and had a negative in the General Government. He had no
objection to the members in the 2d. branch voting per capita, as had been suggested by [Mr. Gerry].

Mr. MADISON concurred in this motion of Mr. Pinkney as a reasonable compromise.

Mr. GERRY said he should like the motion, but could see no hope of success. An accommodation must take place, and it
was apparent from what had been seen that it could not do so on the ground of the motion. He was utterly against a partial
confederacy, leaving other States to accede or not accede; as had been intimated.

Mr. KING said it was always with regret that he differed from his colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from [Mr. Gerry]
on this occasion. He considered the proposed Government as substantially and formally, a General and National Government
over the people of America. There never will be a case in which it will act as a federal Government on the States and not on
the individual Citizens. And is it not a clear principle that in a free Government, those who are to be the objects of a
Government ought to influence the operations of it? What reason can be assigned why the same rule of representation should
not prevail in the 2nd branch as in the 1st.? He could conceive none.

On the contrary, every view of the subject that presented itself, seemed to require it. Two objections had been raised against
it:
1. Drawn from the terms of the existing compact. 2. From a supposed danger to the smaller States. As to the first
objection, he thought it inapplicable. According to the existing confederation, the rule by which the public burdens is to be
apportioned is fixed, and must be pursued. In the proposed Government, it can not be fixed, because indirect taxation is to be
substituted. The Legislature therefore will have full discretion to impose taxes in such modes and proportions as they may
judge expedient.

As to the 2nd objection, he thought it of as little weight. The General Government can never wish to intrude on the State
Governments. There could be no temptation. None had been pointed out. In order to prevent the interference of measures
which seemed most likely to happen, he would have no objection to throwing all the State debts into the federal debt, making
one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 dollars, and leaving it to be discharged by the General Government.

According to the idea of securing the State Governments, there ought to be three distinct legislative branches. The 2nd was
admitted to be necessary, and was actually meant, to check the 1st branch, to give more wisdom, system, and stability to the
Government, and ought clearly as it was, to operate on the people to be proportioned to them.

For the third purpose of securing the States, there ought then to be a 3rd branch, representing the States as such, and
guarding by equal votes their rights and dignities. He would not pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his immediate
Constituents as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief that Massachusetts would never be prevailed on to yield to an equality
of votes. In New York (he was sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that State in the absence of its representatives,
but the occasion required, it), in New York he had seen that the most powerful argument used by the considerate opponents
to the grant of the Impost to Congress, was pointed against the vicious constitution of Congress with regard to representation
and suffrage.

He was sure that no Government could last that was not founded on just principles. He preferred the doing of nothing, to an
allowance of an equal vote to all the States. It would be better he thought to submit to a little more confusion and convulsion,
than to submit to such an evil. It was difficult to say what the views of different Gentlemen might be. Perhaps there might be
some who thought no Government, co-extensive with the United States could be established with a hope of its answering the
purpose. Perhaps there might be other fixed opinions incompatible with the object we were pursuing. If there were, he
thought it but candid that Gentlemen would speak out that we might understand one another.

Mr. STRONG. The Convention had been much divided in opinion. In order to avoid the consequences of it, an
accommodations had been proposed. A committee had been appointed: and though some of the members of it were averse to
an equality of votes, a Report has been made in favor of it. It is agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an end. If no
Accommodation takes place, the Union itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested that if we can not come to any
general agreement, the principal States may form and recommend a scheme of Government. But will the small States in that
case ever accede it. Is it probable that the large States themselves will under such circumstances embrace and ratify it. He
thought the small States had made a considerable concession in the article of money bills; and that they might naturally expect
some concessions on the other side. From this view of the matter he was compelled to give his vote for the Report taken all
together.

Mr. MADISON expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of Government was destroyed, by substituting an
equality in place of a proportional Representation, no proper superstructure would be raised. If the small States really wish for
a Government armed with the powers necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger members as
well as on themselves he could not help thinking them extremely mistaken in their means. He reminded them of the
consequences of laying the existing confederation on improper principles. All the principal parties to its compilation, joined
immediately in mutilating and fettering the Government in such a manner that it has disappointed every hope placed on it.

He appealed to the doctrine and arguments used by themselves on a former occasion. It had been very properly observed by
[Mr. Patterson] that Representation was an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves was rendered
unnecessary; and that the representatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which their constituents if
convened, would respectively have. Was not this remark as applicable to one branch of the Representation as to the other?
But it had been said that the Government would in its operation be partly federal, partly national; that although in the latter
respect the Representatives of the people ought to be in proportion to the people, yet in the former it ought to be according to
the number of States.

If there was any solidity in this distinction he was ready to abide by it, if there was none it ought to be abandoned. In all cases
where the General Government is to act on the people, let the people be represented and the votes be proportional. In all cases
where the Government is to act on the States as such, in like manner as Congress now act on them, let the States be
represented and the votes be equal. This was the true ground of compromise if there was any ground at all. But he denied that
there was any ground. He called for a single instance in which the General Government was not to operate on the people
individually. The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had been exploded
on all hands.

He observed that the people of the large States would in some way or other secure to themselves a weight proportioned to the
importance accruing from their superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a proportional representation in the
Government, they would probably accede to no Government which did not in great measure depend for its efficacy on their
voluntary cooperation; in which case they would indirectly secure their object. The existing confederacy proved that where
the Acts of the General Government were to be executed by the particular Governments, the latter had a weight in proportion
to their importance. No one would say that either in Congress or out of Congress.

Delaware had equal weight with Pennsylvania. If the latter was to supply ten times as much money as the former, and no
compulsion could be used, it was of ten times more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch
confederacy the votes of the Provinces were equal. But Holland which supplies about half the money, governs the whole
republic. He enumerated the objections against an equality of votes in the 2nd branch, notwithstanding the proportional
representation in the first. 1. The minority could negative the will of the majority of the people. 2. They could extort measures
by making them a condition of their assent to other necessary measures. 3. They could obtrude measures on the majority by
virtue of the peculiar powers which would be vested in the Senate. 4. The evil instead of being cured by time, would increase
with every new State that should be admitted, as they must all be admitted on the principle of equality. 5. the perpetuity it
would give to the preponderance of the Northern against the Southern.

Scale was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be pretty well understood that the real difference of interests lay, not
between the large and small but between the Northern and Southern States. The institution of slavery and its consequences
formed the line of discrimination. There were 5 States on the South, 8 on the Northern side of this line. Should a proportional
representation take place it was true, the Northern side would still outnumber the other; but not in the same degree at this
time; and every day would tend towards an equilibrium.

Mr. WILSON would add a few words only. If equality in the 2nd branch was an error that time would correct, he should be
less anxious to exclude it being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan; but being a fundamental and a perpetual
error, it ought by all means to be avoided. A vice in the Representation, like an error in the first concoction, must be followed
by disease, convulsions, and finally death itself. The justice of the general principle of proportional representation has not in
argument at least been yet contradicted. But it is said that a departure from it so far as to give the States an equal vote in one
branch of the Legislature is essential to their preservation. He had considered this position maturely, but could not see its
application.

That the States ought to be preserved he admitted. But does it follow that an equality of votes is necessary for the purpose? Is
there any reason to suppose that if their preservation should depend more on the large than on the small States the security of
the States against the General Government would be diminished? Are the large States less attached to their existence, more
likely to commit suicide, than the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as far as he can conceive, and is liable among
other objections to this insuperable one.

The great fault of the existing confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a complaint against Congress that they governed
overmuch. The complaint has been that they have governed too little. To remedy this defect we were sent here. Shall we
effect the cure by establishing an equality of votes as is proposed? no: this very equality carries us directly to Congress, to the
system which it is our duty to rectify. The small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality, but they may control the
Government as they have done in Congress.

This very measure is here prosecuted by a minority of the people of America. Is then the object of the Convention likely to be
accomplished in this way? Will not our Constituents say? We sent you to form an efficient Government and you have given
us one more complex indeed, but having all the weakness of the former Government. He was anxious for uniting all the
States under one Government. He knew there were some respectable men who preferred three confederacies, united by
offensive and defensive alliances. Many things may be plausibly said, some things may be justly said, in favor of such a
project. He could not however concur in it himself; but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad first principles.

Mr. ELSEWORTH asked two questions one of Mr. Wilson, whether he had ever seen a good measure fail in Congress for
want of a majority of States in its favor? He had himself never known such an instance; the other of Mr. Madison whether a
negative lodged with the majority of the States, even the smallest, could be more dangerous than the qualified negative
proposed to be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate, who must be taken from some one State?

Mr. SHERMAN, signified that his expectation was that the General Legislature would in some cases act on the federal
principle, of requiring quotas. But he thought it ought to be empowered to carry their own plans into execution, if the States
should fail to supply their respective quotas.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Pinkney's motion for allowing New Hampshire 2. Massachusetts, 4, Etc., It passed in the
negative. Massachusetts, no. Mr. King aye. Mr. Ghorum absent. Connecticut, no. New Jersey, no. Pennsylvania, aye.
Delaware, no. Maryland, aye. Virginia, ay. North Carolina, no. South Carolina, aye. Georgia, no.

Adjourned
Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention
By James Madison
July 14, 1787
The Illinois Conservative