Thursday, August 9, 1787


Article IV, Section 6. Mr. RANDOLPH expressed his dissatisfaction at the disagreement yesterday to Sect. 5. concerning
money bills, as endangering the success of the plan, and extremely objectionable in itself; and gave notice that he should move
for a reconsideration of the vote.

Mr. WILLIAMSON said he had formed a like intention.

Mr. WILSON, gave notice that he should move to reconsider the vote, requiring seven instead of three years of Citizenship
as a qualification of candidates for the House of Representatives.

Article IV, Section 6 & 7. Agreed to nem con.

Article V, Section I. taken up.

Mr. WILSON objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the
Legislatures will meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people; the Executives in most of the States
being elected by the Legislatures. As he had always thought the appointment of the Executives by the Legislative department
wrong: so it was still more so that the Executive should elect into the Legislative department.

Mr. RANDOLPH thought it necessary in order to prevent inconvenient chasms in the Senate. In some States the Legislatures
meet but once a year. As the Senate will have more power and consist of a smaller number than the other House, vacancies
there will be of more consequence. The Executives might be safely trusted he thought with the appointment for so short a

Mr. ELSEWORTH. It is only said that the Executive may supply the vacancies. When the Legislative meeting happens to be
near, the power will not be exerted. As there will be but two members from a State vacancies may be of great moment.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Senators may resign or not accept. This provision is therefore absolutely necessary.

On the question for striking out "vacancies shall be supplied by Executives.

New Hampshire, no; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, no; Pennsylvania, aye; Maryland, divided; Virginia,
no; North Carolina, no; South Carolina, no; Georgia, no.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert after "vacancies shall be supplied by the Executives," the following words "unless other
provision shall be made by the Legislature" [of the State].

Mr. ELSEWORTH. He was willing to trust the Legislature, or the Executive of a State, but not to give the former a
discretion to refer appointments for the Senate to whom they pleased.

Question on Mr. Williamson's motion New Hampshire, no; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, no;
Pennsylvania, no; Maryland, ay; Virginia, no; North Carolina, aye; South Carolina, aye; Georgia, aye.

Mr. MADISON in order to prevent doubts whether resignations, could be made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to
accept, moved to strike out the words after "vacancies," and insert the words "happening by refusals to accept, resignations
or otherwise may be supplied by the Legislature of the State in the representation of which such vacancies shall happen, or by
the Executive thereof until the next meeting of the Legislature".

Mr. Govr. MORRIS this is absolutely necessary, otherwise, as members chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being
appointed to any office by Section 9 of this art: it will be in the power of a Legislature by appointing a man a Senator against
his consent to deprive the United States of his services.

The motion of Mr. Madison was agreed to nem con.

Mr. RANDOLPH called for division of the Section, so as to leave a distinct question on the last words "each member shall
have one vote." He wished this last sentence to be postponed until the reconsideration should have taken place on Section 5,
Article, IV, concerning money bills. If that section should not be reinstated his plan would be to vary the representation in the

Mr. STRONG concurred in Mr. Randolph’s ideas on this point.

Mr. READ did not consider the section as to money bills of any advantage to the larger States and had voted for striking it
out as being viewed in the same light by the larger States. If it was considered by them as of any value, and as a condition of
the equality of votes in the Senate, he had no objection to its being re-instated.

Mr. WILSON, Mr. ELSEWORTH and Mr. MADISON urged that it was of no advantage to the larger States, and that it
might be a dangerous source of contention between the two Houses. All the principal powers of the National Legislature had
some relation to money.

Dr. FRANKLIN, considered the two clauses, the originating of money bills, and the equality of votes in the Senate, as
essentially connected by the compromise which had been agreed to.

Col. MASON said this was not the time for discussing this point. When the originating of money bills shall be reconsidered,
he thought it could be demonstrated that it was of essential importance to restrain the right to the House of Representatives
the immediate choice of the people.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. The State of North Carolina had agreed to an equality in the Senate, merely in consideration that money
bills should be confined to the other House, and he was surprised to see the Smaller States forsaking the condition on which
they had received their equality.

Question on the Section I, down to the last sentence.

New Hampshire, aye; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, aye; New Jersey, aye; Pennsylvania, no; Delaware, aye; Maryland,
aye; Virginia; aye; North Carolina, no; South Carolina, divided; Georgia, aye.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved that the last sentence "each member shall have one vote." be postponed. It was observed that this
could not be necessary; as in case the section as to originating bills should not be reinstated, and a revision of the Constitution
should ensue, it would still be proper that the members should vote per Capita. A postponement of the preceding sentence
allowing to each State two members would have been more proper.

Mr. MASON, did not mean to propose a change of this mode of voting per capita in any event. But as there might be other
modes proposed, he saw no impropriety in postponing the sentence. Each State may have two members, and yet may have
unequal votes. He said that unless the exclusive originating of money bills should be restored to the House of Representatives,
he should, not from obstinacy, but duty and conscience, oppose throughout the equality of Representation in the Senate.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS. Such declarations were he supposed, addressed to the smaller States in order to alarm them for their
equality in the Senate, and induce them against their judgments, to concur in restoring the section concerning money bills. He
would declare in his turn that as he saw no prospect of amending the Constitution of the Senate and considered the section
relating to money bills as intrinsically bad, he would adhere to the section establishing the equality at all events.

Mr. WILSON. It seems to have been supposed by some that the section concerning money bills is desirable to the large
States. The fact was that two of those States [Pennsylvania and Virginia] had uniformly voted against it without reference to
any other part of the system.

Mr. RANDOLPH, urged as Col. Mason had done that the sentence under consideration was connected with that relating to
Money bills, and might possibly be affected by the result of the motion for reconsidering the latter. That the postponement
was therefore not improper.

Question for postponing "each member shall have one vote."

New Hampshire, divided; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, no; Pennsylvania, no; Delaware, no; Maryland,
no; Virginia, aye; North Carolina, aye; South Carolina, no; Georgia, no.

The words were then agreed to as part of the section.

Mr. RANDOLPH then gave notice that he should move to reconsider this whole Section 1, Article V, as connected with the
5th Section, Article, IV, as to which he had already given such notice.

Article V, Section 2, taken up.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to insert after the words "immediately after," the following "they shall be assembled in
consequence of-" which was agreed to nem con, as was then the whole Section 2.

Article V. Section 3, taken up.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to insert 14 instead of 4 years citizenship as a qualification for Senators: urging the danger of
admitting strangers into our public Councils. Mr. PINKNEY 2 nds him.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. was opposed to the motion as discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this Country.

Mr. PINKNEY. As the Senate is to have the power of making treaties and managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar
danger and impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign attachments. He quoted the jealousy of the Athenians on
this subject who made it death for any stranger to intrude his voice into their Legislative proceedings.

Col. MASON highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were it not that many not natives of this Country had acquired
great merit during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility into the Senate, to natives.

Mr. MADISON, was not averse to some restrictions on this subject; but could never agree to the proposed amendment. He
thought any restriction however in the Constitution unnecessary, and improper; unnecessary, because the National Legislature
is to have the right of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of residence as conditions of
enjoying different privileges of Citizenship; Improper, because it will give a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution,and
because it will put it out of the power of the Nationa1 Legislature, even by special acts of naturalization, to confer the full
rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers, and because it will discourage the most desirable class of people from emigrating to
the United States.

Should the proposed Constitution have the intended effect of giving stability and reputation to our Governments, great
numbers of respectable Europeans; men who love liberty and wish to partake its blessings, will be ready to transfer their
fortunes hither. All such would feel the mortification of being marked with suspicious incapacitations though they should not
covet the public honors. He was not apprehensive that any dangerous number of strangers would be appointed by the State
Legislatures, if they were left at liberty to do so; nor that foreign powers would made use of strangers as instruments for their
purposes. Their bribes would be expended on men whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite jealousy and
watchfulness in the public.

Mr. BUTLER was decidedly opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the Country. They bring with
them, not only attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Government so distinct from ours that in every point of view they
are dangerous. He acknowledged that if he himself had been called into public life within a short time after his coming to
America, his foreign habits opinions and attachments would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs. He
mentioned the great strictness observed in Great Britain on this subject.

Dr. FRANKLIN was not against a reasonable time, but should be very sorry to see any thing like illiberality inserted in the
Constitution. The people in Europe are friendly to this Country. Even in the Country with which we have been lately at war,
we have now, and had during the war, a great many friends not only among the people at large but in both houses of
Parliament. In every other Country in Europe all the people are our friends. We found in the course of the Revolution that
many strangers served us faithfully, and that many natives took part against their Country. When foreigners after looking
about for some other Country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a preference to ours it is a proof of attachment
which ought to excite our confidence and affection.

Mr. RANDOLPH did not know but it might be problematical whether emigrations to this Country were on the whole useful
or not, but be could never agree to the motion for disabling them for 14 years to participate in the public honors. He reminded
the Convention of the language held by our patriots during the Revolution, and the principles laid down in all our American
Constitutions. Many foreigners may have fixed their fortunes among us under the faith of these invitations. All persons under
this description, with all others who would be affected by such a regulation, would enlist themselves under the banners of
hostility to the proposed System. He would go as far as seven years, but no farther.

Mr. WILSON said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar, mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native,
and the possibility, if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being incapacitated from holding a place under
the very Constitution, which he had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal complexion which the motion
would give to the System, and the effect which a good system would have in inviting meritorious foreigners among us, and
the discouragement and mortification they must feel from the degrading discrimination, now proposed.

He had himself experienced this mortification. On his removal into Maryland, he found himself, from defect of residence,
under certain legal incapacities which never ceased to produce chagrin, though he assuredly did not desire and would not
have accepted the offices to which they related. To be appointed to a place may be matter of indifference. To be incapable of
being appointed, is a circumstance grating and mortifying.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS. The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our
feelings as possible. What is the language of Reason on this subject? That we should not be polite at the expense of prudence.
There was a moderation in all things. It is said that some tribes of Indians, carried their hospitality so far as to offer to
strangers their wives and daughters. Was this a proper model for us? He would admit them to his house, he would invite them
to his table, would provide for them comfortable lodgings; but would not carry the complaisance so far as, to bed them with
his wife. He would let them worship at the same altar, but did not choose to make Priests of them.

He ran over the privileges which emigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of that of being eligible to
the great offices of Government; observing that they exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the world;
and that as every Society from a great nation down to a club had the right of declaring the conditions on which new members
should be admitted, there could be no room for complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those Citizens of the World,
as they call themselves, he owned he did not wish to see any of them in our public Councils. He would not trust them. The
men who can shake off their attachments to their own Country can never love any other. These attachments are the
wholesome prejudices which uphold all Governments. Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the
commerce of France; an Englishman, he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England.

It has been said that The Legislatures will not choose foreigners, at least improper ones. There was no knowing what
Legislatures would do. Some appointments made by them, proved that every thing ought to be apprehended from the cabals
practiced on such occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner who left this State in disgrace, and worked himself into an
appointment from another to Congress.

Question on the motion of Mr. Govr. MORRIS to insert 14 in place of 4 years.

New Hampshire, aye; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, aye; Pennsylvania, no; Delaware, no; Maryland, no;
Virginia, no; North Carolina, no; South Carolina, aye; Georgia, aye.

On 13 years, moved Mr. Govr. Morris

New Hampshire, aye; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, aye; Pennsylvania, no; Delaware, no; Maryland, no;
Virginia, no; North Carolina, no; South Carolina, aye; Georgia, aye.

On 10 years moved by Gen. PINKNEY

New Hampshire, aye; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, aye; Pennsylvania, no; Delaware, no; Maryland, no;
Virginia, no; North Carolina, no; South Carolina, aye; Georgia, aye.

Dr. FRANKLIN reminded the Convention that it did not follow from an omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution
that the persons in question would be actually chosen into the Legislature.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. 7 years of Citizenship have been required for the House of Representatives. Surely a longer term is requisite
for the Senate, which will have more power.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case than the other House. Bribery and cabal can be
more easily practiced in the choice of the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures composed of a few men, than of the
House of Representatives who will be chosen by the people.

Mr. RANDOLPH will agree to 9 years with the expectation that it will be reduced to seven if Mr. Wilson's motion to
reconsider the vote fixing 7 years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period.

On a question for 9 years.

New Hampshire, aye; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, no; New Jersey, aye; Pennsylvania, no; Delaware, aye; Maryland, no;
Virginia, aye; North Carolina, divided;
South Carolina, aye; Georgia, aye.

The term "Resident" was struck out, and "inhabitant" inserted nem con.

Article, V Section 3, as amended agreed to nem con.

Section 4. agreed to nem con.

Article VI, section I, taken up.

Mr. MADISON & Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to strike out "each House" and to insert "the House of Representatives"; the
right of the Legislatures to regulate the times and places, etc., in the election of Senators being involved in the right of
appointing them, which was disagreed to.

Division of the question being called, it was taken on the first part down to "but their provisions concerning, etc."

The first part was agreed to nem con.

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out the remaining part viz., “but their provisions concerning them may at
any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States." The States they contended could and must be relied on in such

Mr. GHORUM. It would be as improper to take this power from the National Legislature, as to Restrain the British
Parliament from regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the Counties themselves.

Mr. MADISON. The necessity of a General government supposes that the State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to
consult the common interest at the expense of their local convenience or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment
of the House of Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of the States, supposes that the result will be
somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not to
have the uncontrolled right of regulating the times, places and manner of holding elections. These were words of great latitude.

It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote
by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place,
should all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district; these and many other
points would depend on the Legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments.

Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to
favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular
States, would produce a like inequality in their representation in the National Legislature, as it was presumable that the
Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter.

What danger could there be in giving a controlling power to the National Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? (1) Of a
Senate to be chosen by the State Legislatures; if the latter therefore could be trusted, their representatives could not be
dangerous. (2) Of Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State Legislatures? Surely then if confidence is
due to the latter, it must be due to the former. It seemed as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in
practice, to give to the State Legislatures this great authority over the election of the Representatives of the people in the
General Legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their Representatives in the State

Mr. KING. If this power be not given to the National Legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may
be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Although this scheme of erecting the General
Government on the authority of the State Legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem as if many
gentlemen, still foster the dangerous idea.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS- observed that the States might make false returns and then make no provisions for new elections Mr.
SHERMAN did not know but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the State

The motion of
Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Rutlidge did not prevail. The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "State".
On the motion of Mr. Read the word "their" was struck out, and "regulations in such cases" inserted in place of, "provisions
concerning them;” The clause then reading, “but regulations in each of the foregoing cases may at any time, be made or
altered by the Legislature of the United States" This was meant to give the National Legislature a power not only to alter the
provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.

Article VI, Section 1, as thus amended was agreed to nem con.

Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention
By James Madison
August 9, 1787
The Illinois Conservative